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lli THE SUPRE.I.JE COUR:r OF THE STATE OF UI'AH

STATE OF UI'AH, in the interest of:
BABY GIRL W\RIE,
A Person under Eighteen Years of Age

BRIEF

case No.

2

OF RESPO'IDENT

STA1D1Em' OF THE KIND OF 'lliE CASE
Th.is is an apt:eal by the natural l!Other fran an Order and JudgiTEnt
of the Juvenile Court entered oo January 9, 1975, pe:rnanently depriving
her of all parental rights in oonnectioo with her child, baby girl Marie;
and fran a decision of the Juvenile Court oo

!~By

4, 1976, refusing to

vacate and set aside as null and void its Order intered oo January 9, 1975.
DISPOOITICN lli La-IER CX>lJRT
Th.e Juvenile Court, upon petitioo of the Utah Divisioo of Family
Services, found that the natural l!Other was unable to adequately provide
for all the needs of said child and agreed with the !!Dther that it was in
the best interest of the child for parental rights to be tenninated and
for the child to be placed for acloptioo.

On April 22, 1976, a hearing was

held at which the Juvenile Court refused to vacate and set aside its order
of January 9, 19 75, terminating parental rights.
RELIEF SOlnlT CN APPEAL

Appellant seeks to have the Juvenile Court order of January 9, 19 75,
terminating parental rights, set aside as null and void, and for reversal
of the Juvenile Court order of May 4, 1976, refusing to vacate its Order of
January 9, 1975.
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srATEMENT OF FACT'S
Respondent substantially agrees with Apfellant' s Staterrent of the
Facts.

Exception is taken, ho.vever, to several voluntary statements which

are not supported by the record.

1.

For example:

"Appellant at no t.iJre wanted to give the baby

It is stated:

up for adoption, but was receiving extrerre pressure from her parents to do

so .... "

(Apt=ellant 's Brief, pg. 2) .

There is no direct. testirrony in the

record about extrerre parental pressure on apt=ellant to give up the baby.
Attorney Daines quotes the parents only to the effect that appellant
could not stay hare if she kept the child, (R.lB) and wanted nothing to do
wit.'fl the baby. (Tr. 2).

Apfellant testified only that her parents didn't

want appellant to keep the baby in their horre because "they just have a
small apart:rrent." (Tr. 3) .

As to Appellant's feelings about giving up the

baby, it is apparently true that she desired to keep the child (R. 18) , but
on January 9, 19 75, she appeared at Court intent upJn giving up the baby.
After a probing discussion with the Court she restated her previous decision

that it was in the best interests of the child to give it up and

voluntarily did so in open court.

(Tr. 3).

It is a deceptive play on "-Drds

for Apfellant to state "Apt=ellant at no t.iJre wanted tO give the baby up for
adoption."

It could as accurately be stated that on January 9, 1975, she

did want to give the baby up.
2.

It is stated twice by Apt=ellant that the DFS Social Worker ad-

vised Apfellant to give up her child for adoption.
pg. 2 and 3).

(Appellant's Brief,

That the DFS felt adoption advisable in the best interest of

the child is evident from the fact that the DFS filed the t=eti tion for
tennination of parental rights.

But there is nothing in the record to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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indicate that such advice was directly given to Appellant, nor that
alternative oounsel may not also have been -given to her.
3.

The se=nd paragraph of page 4 of A[Jfellants brief is an

alleged staterrent of facts as to Apfellants' actions in relation to the
child during the feriod fran 1-9-75 to March 1976.

There is absolutely

nothing in the re=rd of evidentiary nature oonoeming these activities
or relating to this feriod of tirre.

There is nothing in the rea:>rd that

would verify Apr:ellant 's alleged interest in the child as reoounted in
this paragrap-t.
Respondent suggests a surnnary of the significant established facts
as follo,.;s:
1.

Ap[:ellant voluntarily plaoes custody of the child in the DFS

shortly after its birth an or about August 14, 1974.
2.

(R.l2).

OF'S files feti tion for termination of parental rights ·oo

August 22, 19 74.

Father served by publicatioo.

and advised of right to oounsel.

M:>ther served fersatally

(R. 4) .
Counsel present. CCntinued to Novettber 6.

3.

Hearing held 10-24-74.

4.

Hearing held before Judge Roland Anderscn 11-6-74.

present.
5.

Custody in OF'S cantinted.

Counsel

(R. 13) .

Revised fetition filed by OF'S en 12-2-74. (R. 19).

Father served

by publication. llither served fersonally and advised of right to oounsel (AR
6.

Hearing held before Judge Bradford on 1-9-75.

not present.

Counsel waived and

Court finds it is in best interest of child that parental

rights be terminated and child be placed for adopticn.
7.

Adoption of child finalized August 27, 1975.

8.

On

(R. 20; Tr. 1-4).
(Tr. 12).

one year autaratic review matter tenninated in Juvenile Court

by
Judge Anderson 12-4-75. (R. 21).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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9.

Petition to set aside and vacate Juvenile Court decree filed

by Petitioner on April 2, 1976.

10.

(R. 33).

Hearing held April 22, 1976.

Counsel for Appellant present

(R. 34; Tr. 1-24).

11.

Memorandum

filed by Court 5-11-76.

Decision

(R. 35-38).

Court finds:
(1)

Appellant duly afforded counsel and infomed of her

rights thereto at 1-9-75 hearing.
(2)

Appellant guilty of laches in bringing petition for review.

(3)

Appellant voluntarily relinquished parental rights.

(4)

Appellant was incxxnpetent and incapable of providing

necessary care for the child.
(5)

I t was in the best interest of the drild not to revoke the

termination order.

POlliT I.
THE JUVENilE COURI' HAD NO JURISDICTICN TO
VACATE ITS PREVIOUSLY EN'IERED ORDER

Appellant argues that the Juvenile Court has inherent po.Yer, pursuant
to the provisions of Section

55-10-10~. U.C.~.

1953 as amended, to vacate a

previous order at any ti.Jre. Respondent submits that this right of review is
not absolute or unqualified.

Section 55-10-106 must be interpreted in pari

materia with other statutory instruction and applied according to case
decision.
l.

For exaJlllle, as an adoption nutter has been instituted regarding

Baby Girl Marie, it is obvious that the right of the Juvenile Court to revoke a previous

order regarding said child must be tempered by the re-

lationships
theFunding
adoption
proceedings.
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Section 55-10-78 U.C.A. 1953, in speaking of the juris of the
Juvenile Court, states "Nothing contained in this act shall deprive the
district oourts of jurisdiction in adoption proceedings."
Section 78-30-7 U.C.A. 1953 places exclusive jurisdiction in regard
to adoption proceedings in the District Court.
In the case of In re Trimibles' Adoption, 16 Utah 2d 188, 398 P.2d
25 (1965) , the District Court declined jurisdiction in an adoption proceeding
to rule on a question of consent to adoption by reason of desertion, taking
the {X)Sition that the Juvenile Court had exclusive jurisdiction in such

situation.

The Suprerre Court issued a writ of mandamus to the District Court,

stating:
Juris of the district oourt in adoption
proceedings arises when a petition is filed
with the clerk of the district oourt. Once
that jurisdiction is ootained the distrra=urt is to decide all issues necessary to
the adoption. The issue of necessity of
consent because of desertion, when such issue
arises, is a necessary issue to be decided
by the district oourt. The juvenile oourt is
a creature of statute and a oourt of limited
jurisdiction ... To follo,..r the necessary procedural steps in ootaining juvenile =urt
jurisdiction every tirre the issue of necessity
of oonsent arose would be to introduce oonfusion into the adoption proceedings.
(Ibid, 39 8 P. 2d 26 ; enphas is added) .
We submit that once the jurisdiction of the District Court was invoked
by the filing of an adoption petition, the jurisdiction of the District Court
becarre pararrount in deciding all issues necessary to the adoption, including
whether or not Appellant voluntarily consented to texmination of the parental
rights and whether or not she was afforded due process in the tennination
prcceeding.

The Juvenile Court has lost jurisdiction to reoonsider and re-

voke its termination order by the intervention of the District Court in the
adoption proceeding.

To hold otherwise M:Juld put the Juvenile Court on a

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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oollision course with the District Court, allCMing it, by revocation of a
previous termination order, to interfere with a new parent-child relationship created by the District Court.

Or, assuming the District Court ignores

or refuses to recognize any change in status ordered by the Juvenile Court,
then the entire review procedure by the Juvenile Court beCO!TEs an effort in

futility.

The chaos that could result, by recognizing any continuing juris-

diction by the Juvenile Court over baby girl Marie, staggers the mind.
None of the cases cited by Appellant as authority for the Juvenile
Court to reopen a case and rrodify its prior order involve circumstances where
there has been intervening jurisdiction interposed by a constitutional court
of unlimited jurisdiction involving the sarre matter previously disposed of
in the Juvenile Court.
2.

In any event, the Juvenile Court can of its o,.m

in this.case, terminate its continuing jurisdiction.
U.C.A. 1953 provides:

p:::JWer,

and did

Section 55-10-101

"The continuing jurisdiction of the court shall

terminate (1) Upon order of the court .... " etc.
Pursuant to the very authority argued by Appellant, the Juvenile Court
terminated the decree entered by it on January 9, 1975, at a review hearing.
(R. 21)

The question of review and revocation, urged by Appellant, is

actually m::x:>t.

There is nothing for the Juvenile Court to rrodify or set aside

The order under consideration no longer exists and the court's continuing
jurisdicticn in relation to the substance thereof has been terminated.
3.

It is also submitted that rrodification of the termination order,

which of necessity could also modify the custody order made a part thereof,
is specifically prevented by statute.

Section 55-10-108 U.C.A. 1953 reads:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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No petition by a parent may be filed under
this section (m:xlification of custody order)
after his or her parental rights have been
terminated in accordance with Section 55-10-109.
The intent of the Legislature seems to be that a parent does not have
standing before the court to petition for restoration of custody once a
termination order has been entered.

The reason is cbvious.

There can be

no certainty in regard to future disposition of a drild if a parent may
petition for m:xlification of a decree once termination of parental rights
has been ordered.

The available recourse to the parent is appeal.

(Section

55-10-109(3)).
4.

Third parties are

no.~

vitally oonoerned in any revocation of the

termination order; viz the adoptive parents.
vened and must be CXXJsidered.

Their rights have

nGI

inter-

As they were not arrl ~d not be parties in

a Juvenile Court proceeding, we sul:xnit the Juvenile Court

J10,ol

has no juris-

diction to revoke the termination order in derogaticn of their interest in
the adoptive dlild.

This matter cannot

nG~

be reconsidered by the Juvenile

Court in a vacuum, ignoring the very vital concerns of the adoptive parents,
in considering whether a ca1sent to place for adopticn ma.y be revoked. In
the instant case the equities should surely be heavily balanced an the side
of the adoptive parents who have had the child since birth as against a
rrother who waited 15 rronths to challenge a terminaticn decree.
In St.nll1'arY, therefore, it is sul:xnitted, that the Juvenile Court has
no jurisdiction to m:xlify, set aside or otherwise reconsider its order of
January, 1975, terminating Appellant's parental rights for these reasons:
1.

The jurisdiction of the District Court, as a result of the

adoption proce€dings, is no.v pararrount and exclusive in regard to termination
of Appellant's parental rights.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-7-

2.

The Juvenile Court

1

by its

=

act in terminating the tennina tion

order 1 has disoontinued its continuing jurisdiction over the mtter.
3.

The parents only recourse by statute fran a termination order 1

is appeal.
4.

Intervening rights of the adoptive parents preclude reassertion

of jurisdiction by the Juvenile Court.
PO:rnl' II.
APPELLANI' DID Nor TIMELY APPEAL

'lhe hearing regarding termination of Appellant's parental rights was
held on January 9, 1975.

(R. 18).

Findings of Fact and a Decree ordering

that Marie be placed in the custody of the Utah State DFS for the purpose
of adoption were entered by Juvenile Court Judge Charles Bradford on the
same date, January 9, 1975.

(R. 20)

Section 55-10-109(3) provides:
( 3) Unless there is an appeal fran the order
terminating the rights of one or both parents I the
order permanently terminates the legal parent-child
relationship and all the rights and duties, including residual parental rights and duties of the
parents or parents involved.
Section 55-10-112 U.C.A. 1953 provides:
An appeal to the Suprerre Court my be taken
from any order, decree, or judgrrent of the
juvenile oourt ... The appeal must be taken within
one m::mth fran the entry of the order, decree, or
judgm:mt appealed from.
(emphasis added).

'lherefore the appeal ti.rre on the January 9, 19 75 order expired
February 9, 1975.

Appeal was the only recourse open to Appellant from the

January 9, 1975 Order.
that Order.

Technically, an appeal has never been taken fran

(The Notice of Appeal filed in this case on May ll I 19 76 1 is

from the order of the Juvenile Court dated May 4 I 19 76, not from the
January 9, :!.975 order.

See R. 44).

Assuming the Juvenile Court had no
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jurisdiction to hear the Petition to Vacate, as argued by Respondent under
Poi.•t I, and that Appellant has never in fact appealed from the January 9,
1975 Order as herein pointed out, this appeal is illusory and soould .be

dis:nissed.
Irrespective of such position, and assuming an appeal has been taken
as apparently intended by Appellant from both the January 9, 1975 order and
the May 4, 19 76 decision, it is nevertheless herewith argued that this
appeal is untirrely and that Appellant is estopped from this appeal because
of laches.
The Petion to Set Aside and Vacate A Decree Terminating Parental

Ri<tlts was filed by Appellant on April 2, 1976.

(R. 33).

after the Decree was entered on January 9, 19 75.

(R 20) .

This 15 IIDI'lths
During this time

Baby Girl Marie had been placed for adoption, the adoption finalized and the
child gra..m from an infant of 5 l!Dnths to a toddler of 20 !!Dnths, stabilizing
herself in the home of her adoptive parents.
The record reflects no attempt by Appellant or any attorney on her
beJ-talf to petition the court for review of the January 9, 1975 Decree until
April 5, 1976.

Appellant argues that she was an unexperienced juvenile, un-

wed l!Dther, of age 16 caught up in a tralD11atic experience and therefore

could not be expected to be aware of the technical points of law.

The

record belies any clam that Appellant was an inexperienced litigant.

Appellant

was present in Juvenile Court with counsel on at least bolo occassions 10-24-74 and ll-6-74 (R. 9, R. 13).

Certainly she was aware of the avail-

ability of counsel ~1-toul::Jshe be of a mind to contest the January 9, 1975
order.

The fact is that on January 9 she was resolved to give up the baby, did

n0t wunt counsel, and had no intenti~n to resist a Termination Grder. (Tr. 1,3);
Tr. 2,4,11,15).

Appellctnt paints the picture of a distraught l!Dther, spending
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a frantic year trying to learn of her child, and finally going to legal
counsel on advise of the DFS social worker 15 rronths later. (Appellant's
brief, pg. 4).

At what !X)int did the rrother's resolve of January 9 to give

up her baby change?

At that !X)int why didn't she go to her forrrer counsel,

with whcm she was familiar for advise?

\\'hy would the social worker wait

15 rronths before recomrending the Appellant see an attorney?
believe there was scme attempt by the social

~o:orker

Are we to

to deceive the rrother,

scme dereliction of duty on the part of her forrrer counsel who was well aware
of the proceedings, or scme conspiracy between the both of them to hurt this
yoliDg frightened rrother?

It appears rrore to be a rather delayed case of

seller's rem:lrse, which wouldn't be quite so tragic if we were dealing with
a piece of goods rather than a living child.
Appellant contends that laches dces not apply in this case because
Appellant was not advised of her right to appeal.

(App=llant' s Brief pg. 8) .

Judge Bradford admits that he did not orally so advise the Appellant at the
conclusioo of the termination hearing. (R. 36).
factors:

We suggest hio mitigating

First, Section 55-10-96 U.C.A. 1953, tJIXm which Appellant relies,

does not require the Juvenile Court to advise the parent of his right to
appeal at the conclusion of a hearing unless the parent was not represented

by CO\ID"'d·

Appellant was not represented by counsel at this particular

hearing, but she had been throughout the proceedings.

Appellant could have

had counsel at the hearing if she had so desired, and counsel
the January 9, 19 75 hearing and t.!-Je purpose t.'1ereof.

'd3.S

a·.-:are of

( R. 34 , Tr. 1, 4) .

In

view of these circurrstances it seems insignificant and unprejudicial t.".at

the Juvenile Court Judge said nothing aboc;t a;:cpeal at the
January 9 hearing.
hearing.

co:~cl·..1sio:.

of t.'le

In any event it is ,_::-cbu.ble that he di::: so before the

(Tr. 2,15).

Secondly, .?\pp2lla:-:t ad:!lCM'le:::;es t:-.st :'..c:Jpella""!t a:-:-

peared at the Januar; 9 hearing "in res,_:c:-.se to a srr-or:s." ··:::x··lcrts :0:-i·:c::
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?~.

3, A.""~.. 1) .

I f this is the case then Appellant was aware fran the srnncns

-::-.at she had a right of appeal as the legend on the surmo:1s reads:
To Parent{s), Guardian or Custodian{6) You ffi3.Y appeal the Judge's decision to the
Utah Suprer.e Court if initiated within 30 days
of the Juvenile Court Judge's decision.

The doctrine of "lacl1es" is defined as folla.-s:
The established doctrine of equity that,
apart fran any question of statutory limitation

its oourts will disoourage delay and sloth in
the enforcerre.:1 t of rights . Equity demands
=cscience, cpod faith and reasonable diligence.
In their absence t."le oourt will not act. The
object of the doctrine of laches is to exact of
the o::nplaina."'lt fair dealing with his adversary
a"'ld the rule was adopted larely beca'.lSe after
great lapse of tirre, from death of parties, loss
of papers, death of witnesses, change of title,
intervention of equities, or other causes, there
is danger of doing injustice, and there can be no
longer a safe detennination of the controversy.
{The Self-Pronouncing Law Dictionary, Secald
Stu:Jents Edition, I..awyers ~ative Plbli.shing
Co., Rochester, New York, pg. 473).
'I'Oe sul:xni t that the p::lSi tion of ~llant in this rratter is
·~·::.th

this definition.

This oourt should not oountenance

on all fours

~llant's

delay in

seeki...-.s .::-evocation of a 15 ::or:t.'1 old oourt order, especially in view of the
.:..."'lten,en::ion of t.'lird-?=ty ec;.rities and t."'le grave danger of cbin3 injustice

::.o sald ?CJ.rt.ies.

Resp:mdent e.r:tirely agrees wi t."'l

eq-_;,j, ::y ::-a ::<:e.::- o: the :-..l.;f'.est ::egree.

·..we

ca"'l."XJt

~lant

t."'lat this is an

oonsider t."'lis ::atter i."'l an

C";-.e t."'lecr-1 · o!' lac:-:es f:x:-..l.Ses ·.1;:on t:.o.·o eler.ents.

(l)

Lack of diligence
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time between relinquishrrent and attempted revocation.
v. Social Service and Child

w.

Dept., 19

u~

In the case of D-- P-

2d 311, 431 P.2d 547 (1967), this

court ordered restoration of custody to a natural mther.

The court discussed

at sorre length the diligence exercised by the natural mther, being obviously
influenced thereby.

In that case the natural mther executed a release to

the social agency within 24 hours follo.Ying the birth of her child. Seven days
later she contacted her doctor in an effort to get the baby.
she contacted the placerrent agency for the sarre purpose.

Five days later

Four days later a

petition was filed - only three weeks and one day after the birth of the baby.
Trial was held when the baby was only one mnth old - two weeks later the
findings and conclusions were signed.

The court, of course, was infhenced

by other things, including the mther's physical state at the time she gave
the consent as well as the fact that as of the date of trial petition for
adoption had not been filed.

But the court then contrasted that case with

other Utah cases where longer waiting periods had been involved with different
results.

The diligence of the natural mther and the lack of injury to

respondent attributable to her were to a large part dispositive of the case.
In the instant case to the converse the lack of diligence on the part of the

mther with resultant grave injury to the real respondents (adoptive parents)
certainly would dictate a much different result.

Mr. Justice Crockett re-

cognized these variables and even that intervening rights may be vested when
he stated in an earlier case:
Reading of many cases on this subject teaches
that each depends upon its ONn facts: the circumstances of the placerrent of the child, those under
which the consent was given, the length of time the
adopting parents have had the child, any "vested rights"
that have intervened, the welfare and the
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child; the a:mduct, as well as the character
and ability of the respective claimants; these
and the particular governing statute are all
given consideration in determining whether the
consent can be revoked. (In re Adoption of D.

122 Utah 525, 252 P.2d 223 (1953)).
Applyinq these considerations as i f a test as to whether t:ennination
of parental rights should be revoked in the instant case a fair application
dictates as follows:

1.

The child was placed by an authorized goverrurent agency with no

questions as to the appropriateness thereof.
2.

A consent to the termination of parental rights was voluntarily

given in open court after considered resolve.
3.

The child is rDN alnost two years old, has never been in the

custody of the natural rrother, and has been in an adoptive house for over one
year.
4.

The welfare of the child is obviously best served in the hate of

the adoptive parents.

The natural rrother

still resides with parents (appellant's

brief pg. 4) who refuse to board the child or have anything to do with it, and
there has been no evidence produced that she is in any way better able to
provide and care for the child now than when the Juvenile Court found her
inCXJ¥tant and incapable of providing the necessary care for the child."

(R 35)
5.

As to the "application of a particular governing statute" this will

be treated in the next point.
It is submitted, therefore, that laches prevents any revocation of the
previous termination order.
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POlliT III.
THE APPELLANT Is PARENTAL RICHI'S
WERE LEGALLY AND PROPERLY TERMINATED
BY THE JUVENILE COURT.

Appellant goes to some lengths to analyze Section 55-10-109 U.C.A.
1953 (Tennination of Parental Rights) and quotes several cases providing
various examples of "conduct or condition seriously detri.rrental to a child"
wherein tennination was or was not upheld under said statue.
particular issue with the analysis of the statute.

We take no

We simply contend that

the statute does have application in the instant case.

Section 55-10-109 (1) {a)

I

provides:
(1) The court rray decree a termination of
all parental rights with respect to one or both
parents if the court finds:
(a) That the parent or parents are
unfit or incanpetent by reason of conduct or
condition seriously detrirrental to the child;
or . • • • (errq:ilasis added) .
That the Petition for Termination {R. 19) alleges appellant was "not
at fault" does not prevent termination where a condition seriously detrirrental

to the child exists, appellants argurrent to the contrary.

There was a reason

why the Legislature added the phrase "or condition" - a reason aptly illustrate:
by the present case.

After reviewing the facts that (1) The child in the

care of appellant would be homeless, ( 2) The appellant could not provide
financial support for the child, {3) The appellant 1 s parents v.>ere unwilling

to care for the child, {4) The natural father was unkno,.m and had no interest
{R. 19,20).

{5) And that after 15 rronths there was no indication the cir-

cumstances had changed, the court properly concluded that its original order
of January 9, 1975 terminating parental rights because of such conditions
involving the natural parents was in the best interest of the child and
there was no reason to revoke said order 14 rronths later.

The Juvenile Court,
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trier of the facts with direct infonre.tion and impression regarding the
circumstances, found that the appellant wa.S- in fact in~tent and incapable
of providing necessary care for the child, a "oonditton seriously detrimental
to the child" as the statute requires.
these conditions were true.

(Tr. 3)

In open rourt appellant agreed all
Try as we may we cannot see how the

provisions of Section 55-10-109 (1) (a) do not fit the instant case. as

a~llant

contends.
I t should be rerrerbered that the Juvenile Court treated this case as a

hybrid situation under both the involuntary termination provisions of Section
109 (1) and a voluntary termination under Section 55-10-109 (5).
Appellant says the court cannot do this.
not?

H~

(R. 35).

(Appellant's Brief, pg 12-13) Why

else could the interest of the child be protected where the IIDther

voluntarily relinquishes and the father is l.ll'lkncMn.
Court hang a terminaticn on "both pegs?"

As

Why can't the Juvenile

we read the

c::ourts

Merorand\ml

Decision, he terminated the unknown father's rights on an involuntary basis,
and tre appellant rrother' s parental rights on both a voluntary and an involuntary basis. (R. 35)

Does that do violence to the statute?

There is no

disjunctive function word between Sections 55-10-109(1) and 55-10-109(5).
AssU!TE a situation where an involuntary petition for termination of parental
rights is filed against X.

X is served.

and voluntary relinquishes his rights.

X voluntary appears at the hearing
Would appellant have us take the

position that the court could not act and that the proceeding was a nullity?
Does appellant seriously contend that because appellant voluntarily consented
the tennination order as to the unknown father is void and he still has
parental riqhts in the child?

(Appellant's Brief, p. 17) ·

We conclude that ,;ppellu.nt 's parental rights were legally and properly
tenninated by the Juvenile Court.
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POINT IV.
APPELLANT WAS Nai' DE:'JIED HER
RIGIT TO COUNSEL AT THE HE.ZIJUNG 00
THE PSTITION TO TERMINATE PARENTAL
RIGW1'S.

Appellant argues that she was denied the right to =unsel at the
January 9, 1975 tennination of parental rights hearing.

This argurrent is

based upon the fact that the transcript typed from a re=rding of the January
9, 19 75 hearing indicates no reference to representation of counsel for
Appellant.
This issue was raised at the hearing on the Petition to Set Aside And
Vacate a Decree Terminating Parental Rights held on April 22, 1976 (Tr. 2-23).
The Juvenile Court Judge addressed the issue in his Memorandum Decision of
May 4, 1976 (R. 35-38).

He ooncluded that the petitioner (Appellant) was

duly afforded oounsel and duly infomed of her rights thereto.

In that decision the Judge reoounts that Appellant had been represented
by oounsel at three prior proceedings involving the same parties and substantially the same issues.

Attorney William Daines had been app::>inted

by the oourt for Appellant at the first hearing, after she was advised of
her right to oounsel and indicated her desire for appointed representation.
Mr. Daines stood ready to appear with appellant at the January 9, 1975 hear-

ing, acoording to the judge, but was not wanted by the appellant. (Deputy
County Attorney Jones proffered proof at the hearing

that Attorney Daines,

who had represented Appellant in the past, stated that aprellant had =ntactee
him

but had decided to proceed without =unsel.

(R 34) .

The Merrorandurn Decision also sets forth the re=llection of the court
that a discussion was had by and aJTDng Aprellant, the County Attorney,
Division of Family Services workers and the =urt regardinq the nnther' s
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decision to corre before tl1<:1 court and voluntarily relinquish her rights to
P~1·

Girl Marie by not contesting the Petition to Terminate Parental Rights.

The court was convinced that Appellant neither wanted nor needed counsel for
the January 9, 1975 proceedings.

Section 55-10-109 (2) requires only that

parties to a termination proceeding be advised of their right to counsel.
Actual presence of counsel is not predicated to a valid proceeding.

A right

to be represented by counsel does not inply that a party must have counsel
even against their a..m wishes or desires.
Respondent would urge the court to consider the transcript of both
the January 9, 1975 hearing and the April 22, 1976 hearing on the Petition to
Vacate (Tr. 1-4; 1-23) and, further, the Merrorandum Decision of the court dated
May 4, 1976 (R. 35-38).

Summons personally served upon Appellant (R.A 1) in

connection with the January 9, 1975 hearing specifically advised
her right to counsel, as well as her right to

a~al.

a~llant

of

These parts of the

rea::>rd in particular, and the record read as a whole, refute Appellant's claim
that she was denied the right to counsel.
POINI' V.
THE EVIDENCE FULLY SUPPORI'S THE OEX::ISICN
BY THE JUVE:ULE COORI' 'ro ORDER A TERMINATICN OF
THE P~AL RIGn'S OF THE APPELI.J'..NT.

The Statutory test for termination of parental rights requires a finding of conduct or condition that is seriously detrirrental to the child.
(Section 55-10-109 (a) U.C.A. 1953).
evidence."

Proof must be by a "preponderence of

(State v. Lance, 23 Utah 2d 407, 464 P.2d 395 (1970).

In the instant case the Juvenile (trial) court found:
was unwed.

(2)

by the court.

(1) The ITOther

The natural father was unkno.m and could not be determined
( 3)

The natural ITOther was unable to adequately provide for

all the needs vf tl"w chiU (4)

or provide a hom::: for the child.

The rmtcmal grandparents refused to care for
(5)

The natural ITOther (appellant) agreed
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it was in the best interest of the child for parental rights to be
terminated and the child be placed for adoption. (R. 18,20)

At the time

of t.he subsequent hearing 15 rronths later the conditions had not changed.
(R.

38)

The record supports the findings as to said =nditions and

appellant has not

ccr~tradicted

the existence of said =nditions in its brief

on appeal.
In effect the child was at birth horreless and would have, and apparently

still would be, in that sarre condition if custody had been mintained with
or were

naN

restored to appellant.

It is impossible to conceive a circumstan02

rrore seriously detrimental to the child. The preponderence of the evidience
certainly substantiates that it was in the best interest of the child to
terminate the appellant's parental rights.
the contrary.

There is actually no evidence to

The only evidentiary grounds left to appellant is the pre-

sumption of preference afforded to the natural rrother - to which, ha..Jever,
the welfare of the child is pararrount.

(In re State In Interest of Jennings,

20 Utah 2d 50, 432 P.2d 879 (1967).
Appellant cites the dissent of Chief Justice Henriod in the case of
State of Utah, in the interest of T.G.

532 P. 2d 997 (1975) in arguing in-

sufficency of evidence in the instant case.

In the T .G. case the mjority

opinion affirmed a termination order of the Juvenile Court on findings by that

court that (1) The natural rrother had no necessary skills to train and
supervise a child, (2)
being, and (3)

housekeeping standards jeopardized the child's well

the natural rrother was of la..J rroral standards.

\~e

sutmit

none of these circumstances, as detrimental as they may be, are as detrirrental as being horreless.

Justice Henroid d<issented, not on the basis of

insufficiency of evidence, but because he has a question regard in'] the= constitutionality of the termination statute itself, in view of the p2rm:mcncy
of Sponsored
deprivation
authorized
by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.thereby.
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Apr:ellant also cites the case of State of Utah, in the interest of
Pitts, 535 P.2d 1244 (1975) as additional authority for insufficiency of
evidence in the instant case.

We believe the Pitts case is clearly dis-

tin:JUishable fro.'11 the instant case for nany reasons.

In the Pitts case

0;o

infant children were left at a hotel in care of a friend by the natural
parents.

The hotel had a fire and the children were delivered by the friend

to the paternal grandrrother.

The grandrrother kept the children for a time

until she could no longer care for them, and then delivered them to the
Division of Family Services.

The DFS subsequently filed a r:etition for

temination of parental rights which was granted by the Juvenile Court.

The

natural parents then appealed frun a refusal of the Juvenile Court to vacate
such order.

Evidence in the Pitts case indicated the foll(7.oling distinctions

from our present case:

(1)

The natural parents were not duly notified of

nor present at the original temination hearing.

(2)

The natural rother had

ITB.intained contact with the children and !l'ade efforts to see to their care
whe:1 absent from them.

( 3)

The natural parents had not given their consent

to tennination of parental rights.
quiry to locate the parents.

(5)

(4)

The DFS had not !l'ade diligent in-

There was no evidence the children had been

placed for adoption.
These di ffcrences are greatly significant and present a whole different
situation from the instant case, where a homeless infant, never in the care of
the natural rmtJ1er, father W1kJ1(7.oln, is placed for adoption with the consent of
the n<Jtural rmtller adopted, and rronths later a revocation is attempted.
Appella:1t
Inc:c Pillinq,

C't

also cites ilie case of State of Utah, in the Interest of
al, 23 lit. 2d 407, 464 P.2d 393 (1970), wherein a juvenile

crurt tcnni:-utinc1 order •.-:1s reversed by this court.
clcJdy distic1! lish_tblc ft-'nl the instant case.

Once again the case is

In the Pilling case , three
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daughters and one son were taken from the parents by the Juve01ile Court.
Custody of the three daughters was placed with their natural father, a
previous husband, and all parental rights were terminated to the son.
distinguishing facts are as follo.vs:

(l)

The

The children were older, two

being of school age, and had lived with their mother for soiTE tine.

(2) No

evidence that mother would not or oould not oorrect certain proble:ns in the
home was introduced.
(4)

(3) The natural parents had not consented to termination

The juvenile court had withheld certain "secret evidence" (social reports)

from the appellant, and (5) there had been no adoption of the children.
We submit that the evidence adduced in the instant case clearly preponderated a condition seriously detrinental to the child and supported the
termination order.
POINT VI
THE WELFARE OF THE CHILD AND FINDlliGS
OF THE JUJENILE COURT lli RELATION THERErO ARE
OF PARAMJLNT CONSIDERATIOO ON REVIEW BY THIS

COURI'.
Though the presunption that a natural mother is the best parental influence on a child has been recognized by this court, a paramount interest
has been enunciated as follo.vs:

While ordinarily the parents have a right
to custody of their c..'1ildren, the State also
has an interest in the welfare of children,
which is paramount thereto. (In re State of Utah
in the interest of Ronald Jenm.ngs, et al. , 60

Utah 2d 50, 432 P.2d 879 (1967).
We submit the Juvenile Court, in the interest of Baby Girl Marie, rude
the right decision in terminating the parental rights of appella'lt, and later

in refusing to set aside such decision after the adoption of the child.
Hearings in Juvenile Court involving custody of children are not adverse, but
are highly equitable in nature, designed to inquire into the welfare of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-20-

children, not the desires of the parents.

(State in the Interest of K-

s--,

7 Utah 2d 398, 326 P.2d 395 (1958). No one has a "right" in the life of another
hU!T13J1 being =ntrary to the happiness or best interest of said being.
I t is also axiaratic that the trial judge, because of his closeness

to the situation, has a good vantage p::Jint regarding the evidence.

As stated

by this =urt:
Becuase of the advantage p::Jssessed by
the trial judge, we feel reluctant to d!ange
his findings unless we are =nvinced that they
are not supported by the evidence. (In re State
of utah in the Interest of Ronald Jennings, et al. ,
supra).

We are aware the =urt is sanewhat sensitive about being reminded of
this axian, but we submit that it is particularly apropos in the instant case,
particularly as to the demeanor and understanding of the appellant at the
January 9 , 19 75 termination hearing.
CXJN.:LUSION

Resp::Jndent is not unsympathetic or calloused to the alleged position
and feelings of the natural !IDther, appellant in this case.

The writer of

this brief has been on the natural !IDthers' side.

v. SOcial Services,

(D-- P--

supra). We agree with Appellant's =unsel that extrerre grief will unooubtedly

occur not matter how the question is finally resolved.
But our sympathies with the young !IDther should not be allowed to clou1
our vision or understanding of the true circumstances of this case.
procedural rights of appellant 1-:ere not denied or circumvented.

The

She was

advised of her right both to =unsel and to appeal in relation to the January 9
tennination hearing. (SI.llTlTDns- AR 1, ~le!IDrandum Decision - R 38) .

She was

ad'iised in the Sl.llTlTDns that it v.'as prop::Jsed to terminate her parental rights,
as the statute rec~ires.

The Juvenile Court judge also probed her under-

standing of this p::Jssibility with her.

There was no disregard for procedural
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due process nor haste in the proceedings, except as may have been dictated
and justified by the circumstances of the child.
The fact remains that appellant had no way to provide for her child,
or at least gave no evidence of such ability or effort to find a way.

Though

this circumstance may be a tragic indictment of our social degeneration, it
cannot be allowed to prejudice the horreless, helpless, unresponsible infant.
A o:mdition seriously detrirrental to the child existed, the Juvenile Court
had little choice than to proceed as it did.
As a matter of legal principles, we believe this case presents the
oourt, arrong other things, with opportunity to clearly enunciate a position
in regard to jurisdiction to revie-J termination orders when adoption proceedings have intervened, as argued in our Point I.
We urge the Court to affirm the termination order of the Juvenile Court
and its subsequent refusal to vacate said order.
Respectfully submitted

Franklyn B. Matheson
Assistant AttoiTiey General
AttoiTiey for Respondent
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